Save Our Schools  - A Challenge Beyond the Courts by Neil A. Nowick
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 18 
Number 3 Volume 18, Summer 1972, Number 3 Article 3 
March 2017 
"Save Our Schools" - A Challenge Beyond the Courts 
Neil A. Nowick 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the Catholic Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Neil A. Nowick (1972) ""Save Our Schools" - A Challenge Beyond the Courts," The Catholic Lawyer: Vol. 18 : 
No. 3 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol18/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
"SAVE OUR SCHOOLS"-A
CHALLENGE BEYOND
THE COURTS*
On April 28, 1972, 30,000 students from Catholic elementary
schools in New York City marched past Governor Rockefeller's office
chanting, "Save our schools."' During the past year a string of federal
court rulings against state plans to aid parochial schools2 was broken
by only one favorable holding." The children who paraded to save
their schools were doing so in response to the opinion of a three-judge
federal pane 4 that New York's Mandated Services Act of 1970 was
unconstitutional because it violated the first amendment requirement of
separation of church and state.
* This article is a student work prepared by Neil A. Nowick, a member of the
ST. JOHN's LAW REVIFw and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
1 There has been a major decline in the number of parochial schools throughout
the country. A vicious cycle has developed wherein the lack of sufficient funds
has caused the schools to be less attractive, which, in turn, has caused enrollment
to decline. The New York Times reported that, in 1960, there was a total enroll-
ment of 4.3 million children in 10,372 Catholic elementary schools. Ten years
later, in 1970, enrollment had dropped to 3.7 million and the number of elemen-
tary schools had dwindled to 9,947. Enrollment in Catholic high schools and
colleges, on the other hand, has increased although the total number of high
schools dropped slightly. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1972, at 6, col. 6.
2 Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty (PEARL) v. Levitt, 342 F.
Supp. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), hearing granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Nov. 7,
1972) (No. 72-269); Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Ohio), afi'd -
U.S. - (1972); Lemon v. Sloan, 340 F. Supp. 1356 (E.D. Pa. 1972), appeal
docketed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3241 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1972) (No. 72-620); Americans
United for Separation of Church and State v. Oakley, 339 F. Supp. 545 (D. Vt.
1972). It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on
the subject of parochial aid, its summary affirmance of the three-judge court de-
cision in Wolnan, gave no promise of relief to parochial schools. The Wolman
case is discussed at length in this note. See notes 67-72 and accompanying text
infra.
3 PEARL v. Nyquist, - F. Supp. - (October 2, 1972).
4 PEARL v. Levitt, 342 F. Supp. 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The Mandated Services
Act (N.Y. SEss. LAws ch. 138 (1970)) provided $28 million dollars a year in
direct aid to nonpublic schools in reimbursement for fulfilling state educational
requirements, i.e., administering examinations, filing state reports and keeping at-
tendance records. N.Y. Times, April 28, 1972, at 15, col. 2.
174
SAVE OUR SCHOOLS
A combination of factors, some financial,
some social and some religious, has caused
the current plight of parochial schools.'
No single factor can be isolated for blame
although there are many who feel that
tuition increases have been the major
cause of the dilemmaY This assumption
is not supported by scrutiny of the en-
rollment charts of Catholic schools across
the nation since such examination reveals
that the reduced attendance is caused,
not by a withdrawal of children already en-
rolled in parochial schools, but by a refusal
to enroll younger children as they reach
school age.7 The charts demonstrate that
the enrollment decline is highest in the
elementary schools as opposed to the high
schools and colleges. 8 Since tuition has al-
ways been low or nonexistent in the elemen-
tary grades, tuition increases at that level
can hardly be held accountable for the more
than 20 per cent decline in enrollment since
1965. 9 It is necessary to understand why
parochial school facilities and population
5 See C. KooB & R. SHAW, S.O.S. FOR CATHOLIC
SCHOOLS: A STRATEGY FOR FUTURE SERVICE TO
CHURCH & NATION 61-69 (1970); E. BARTELL,
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF CATHOLIC ELEMENTARY
AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS 255-83 (1969).
1 Bartell, Good News and Bad for Catholic
Schools, AMERICA, April 1, 1972, at 343 [here-
inafter Bartell].
7 Id.
s Note 1 supra. If present conditions persist, how-
ever, Catholic high schools will probably ex-
perience an enrollment decline as the smaller
size elementary classes reach high school age.
:) In 1965, 7 million children (about 14 per cent
of the school age total) attended private schools.
Now, after a drop of 23 per cent in private
school enrollment, approximately 5.4 million
children or 10 per cent of the school age total
attend nonpublic schools. N.Y. Times, Mar. 6,
1972, at 23, col. 1.
are dwindling before one can really ap-
preciate the challenge that is presented each
time a new state aid program is presented
to the courts for constitutional considera-
tion. Many of these programs, which will be
discussed later, were formulated to achieve
one objective: circumvention of the three-
pronged separation of church and state test
formulated by the Supreme Court.10
Why are Catholic schools closing down?
Some of the reasons are beyond the power
of any Church-adopted educational policy
decision or governmental program to cor-
rect. Such reasons include the decline in
the Catholic birth rate during the past few
years, a phenomenon that relates to Church
loyalty,1 and changing parental tastes such
as an increasing reluctance of younger,
highly educated Catholic parents to send
their children to parochial schools when
the future of such schools is questionable
and nearby public schools may offer a
secular education that is academically su-
perior. The latter problem is aggravated by
the fact that the migration of the middle
class Catholic to the suburbs has not been
10 The test was expressed in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971):
First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an
excessive entanglement with religion."
Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
it Ernest Bartell, a member of the President's
Commission on School Finance, administered a
national economic study of Catholic elementary
and secondary schools and found that the de-
clining birth rates could be correlated with
baptismal rates. Baptismal rates are sometimes
used as an index of Church loyalty and, signifi-
cantly for the future of Catholic education, they
were found to be declining faster than birth rates.
See Bartell, note 6 supra.
matched, or even closely paralleled, by the
construction of Catholic schools in the
newly populated areas.1 2 Many parents are
antipathetic toward the Catholic school
philosophy; some parents merely lack con-
fidence in the schools' stability and dura-
bility. These are not problems which are
solved with government aid for, even if
state aid was available, these attitudes
might well persist.15
Unfortunately, a grave financial crisis
does exist. Operating costs for Catholic
schools in 1975-76 are expected to increase
to $575 per pupil at the elementary level
and $950 per pupil at the secondary level.
Deficits of $200 per pupil are likely to
occur by 1976. Fifty per cent of the
Church's total operating revenues would be
consumed by Catholic schools in order to
educate a mere 20 per cent of the Catholic
children in school. Ernest Bartell, a mem-
ber of the President's Commission on
School Finance, sums up the problems by
stating:
[U]nder more plausible assumptions about
the feasibility of Catholic school consoli-
dation and equally plausible predictions of
inflationary trends and church revenue pat-
terns, the additional deficits required to
educate those 20 per cent of Catholic chil-
dren easily exceed the amounts that could
be expected politically in aid from the
public sector, even if constitutional barriers
are surmounted. 14
12 Had some of the schools moved from the
urban areas along with the middle class, thus
offering a choice to suburban Catholic parents,
parochial school enrollment might not have
dropped so sharply.
13 N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1972, at 86, col. 1.
14 Bartell, note 6 supra, at 343.
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Thus, it is apparent that a considerable
question as to the viability of Catholic
schooling would remain even if govern-
mental aid were constitutionally approved.
The answer lies in making the schools more
attractive and "now-oriented." Financial
problems would most likely be relieved by
an increase in enrollment and a change of
attitude among Catholics. 15 While the
courts may allow some form of temporary
financial relief, any long range solution
must include educational innovations that
will mold parochial schools into multi-
purpose educational units serving both the
secular and religious needs of the Catholic
community.16
In the interim, the recent decision in
Committee for Public Education and Reli-
15 Id. at 345. The key to changing the present
attitudes of Catholics is motivation. Administra-
tors, educators, parents and students must be
motivated to regard innovation in parochial
schools as a group project. Catholic families now
contribute only slightly more than one per cent
of their incomes to parochial schools. With a
new "now-oriented" parochial school system as a
goal, such contributions could double.
16 The Presidential Commission on School
Finance suggested 13 ways nonpublic schools
could lighten their burden:
Several of its suggestions deal with meeting
the ideological problem of the nonpublic
school: clarify its unique identity, lead the way
in integrated education, increase contact with
others, establish partnership with colleges, ac-
cept greater risks, break the crisis image,
adopt a vigorous recruiting program.
Self-help in finances was also recommended:
practice greater accountability, increase income
from private sources, pool resources in some
areas, experiment with mobile units for class-
room use, adopt firmer control over operating
costs, intensify pupil-teacher and parent-teacher
relationships.
Spiers, Tax Credits for Nonpublic School Pa-
rents, AMERICA, May 20, 1972, at 536-37.
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gious Liberty (PEARL) v. Nyquist, up-
holding the constitutionality of tax benefits
while voiding a tuition assistance plan and
construction grants, is evidence that the
legal battle between the separatists and the
"parochiaid" advocates will most assuredly
continue. This Note will attempt to analyze
the most recent cases in terms of the chal-
lenge or innovation the questioned pieces of
legislation presented and the reasons that
courts chose to frustrate or, in the case of
PEARL v. Nyquist, uphold these efforts to
provide parochial aid. Some solutions to
the problems which face the parochial
schools will also be suggested. A number
of these solutions are currently being tested,
some are at the drawing board stage and
others are modifications of legislative solu-
tions already rejected by the courts.
Throughout the country, advocates of
parochial aid have been energetically devis-
ing and passing various types of legislation
aimed at finding a breach in the constitu-
tional wall the courts have erected. The
result has been an appreciable increase in
the number of "parochiaid" court cases of
which those discussed below are the most
significant.
Review of the 1972 Judicial Decisions
PEARL v. Nyquist
In an effort to save parochial schools
from financial disaster, the New York Leg-
islature, earlier this year, passed an Act
which would have provided funds for (1)
maintenance and repair of the schools, (2)
tuition assistance to low-income families
with children in private schools and (3)
income tax benefits to families who send
their children to nonpublic schools. 17 The
Act was immediately challenged in PEARL
v. Nyquist,' s a three-judge federal panel
finding that the tuition assistance program
and the maintenance grants violated the
establishment clause of the first amendment
while concluding, 2-1, that the income tax
benefit plan was constitutional. 9 Each sec-
tion of the statute will be discussed sepa-
rately.
Section I provided for dollar grants from
the state treasury to nonpublic schools for
maintenance purposes. Such purposes in-
cluded "the provision of heat, light, water,
ventilation and sanitary facilities, cleaning,
janitorial and custodial services, snow re-
moval"20 and other services relating to the
upkeep of nonpublic school buildings,
grounds and equipment. The grant, in dol-
lar terms, would have amounted to $30
per pupil with increases for certain named
exceptions. 21
17 N.Y. LAWS ch. 414 (1972).
18 - F. Supp. - (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 1972).
19 Id. Relying on the assumptions that "the Legis-
lature intended to provide a quality education for
all children who attend nonpublic schools in low-
income areas" and that "the Legislature intended
to preserve the health and safety of children who
attend non-public schools in low-income areas,"
the court set out to determine the constitutionality
of the Act. Id. at -. Second Circuit Judge Paul
Hays dissented from the panel's opinion on the
tax benefit plan.
20 - F. Supp. at -.
21 The grant would be increased to $40 dollars
per pupil if a school were more than 25 years
old. However, all maintenance grants would be
restricted to "fifty per centum of the average per
pupil cost of equivalent maintenance and repair
in the public schools of the state on a state-wide
basis, as determined by the commissioner [of
education]." N.Y. LAWS ch. 414, § 551(1)
(1972).
In striking down these maintenance
grants, the three-judge Southern District of
New York panel relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Tilton v. Richardson.2 2
Tilton held that construction grants for
buildings used for religious purposes were
unconstitutional. 23 Recognizing that a pa-
rochial school budget is far from divisible
into secular and religious components, the
PEARL court was able to reject an argu-
ment that janitorial services and snow re-
moval are not aids to religion and, there-
fore, their neutrality permits a grant from
the state treasury. The court noted:
Not having to pay the janitor makes it
reasonable to assume that the money other-
wise going to him can be used to increase
the salary of a religious teacher or the
fund for the purchase of objects of re-
ligious devotion.2 4
Janitorial services aid the parochial schools
so they do not have a completely secular
purpose. Light and heat are provided to
classrooms where religion is taught. "There
is no suggestion that heat is to be cut off
while prayer or religious teaching is con-
ducted in the same schoolroom. 25
In holding that the program of main-
tenance grants to nonpublic schools in-
volved an excessive entanglement of gov-
ernment and religion, the court also cited
the reasoning used in Walz v. Tax Commis-
22 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
23 Id. The Tilton court also held that payments
could be made to certain church-related colleges
for construction grants if the facilities receiving
the grants were in no way engaged in the teaching
or practicing of religion.
24 - F. Supp. at -.
25 Id.
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sion.2 6 In administering the grants, New
York State would have to audit the finan-
cial reports of nonpublic schools to deter-
mine whether their expenditures were in
proportion to the allotments granted. Gov-
ernment officials would have to decide
whether the proportion of grant to total
tuition was the same as the proportion of
secular teaching to religious teaching. Thus,
the PEARL court found it easy to agree
with a statement made by Chief Justice
Burger, speaking for the Walz majority:
"Obviously a direct money subsidy would
be a relationship pregnant with involve-
ment."27
Section II entitled parents of elementary
and secondary nonpublic school children
to a tuition grant if their family incomes
did not exceed $5000 per annum. For
children in grades one through eight, the
reimbursement would be $50 per pupil.
This sum would be doubled for children
in grades 9 through 12. The State Legisla-
ture also imposed a "constitutional" re-
striction aimed at giving this "Elementary
and Secondary Opportunity Program" 28 a
better chance of surviving the inevitable
court challenges. The tuition grant was
restricted to a maximum of 50 per cent of
26 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Mr. Justice Brennan
concluded that "general subsidies of religious ac-
tivities would, of course, constitute impermissible
state involvement with religion." Id. at 690 (con-
curring opinion).
27 Id. at 675.
28 Each section had its own formal title. Section
11 was the result of a legislative finding that a
poor parent's "right" to select an education for
his child was seriously denied even though such
"right" of selection has been recognized by the
Supreme Court. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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the child's tuition. The legislature feared
that a 100 per cent grant would be held
an indirect government subsidy of the en-
tire cost of religious education for some
children. However, Section I's attempt to
aid poor parents failed for the reasons
discussed below.
The court decided that parochial schools
were the ultimate recipients of the tuition
reimbursements although parents received
the grants directly. "The parent is simply a
conduit,"21 ) declared the opinion. It was
argued that, since State aid is constitution-
ally used to reimburse children's bus trans-
portation 30 and to loan textbooks, 31 tuition
grants should also be allowed. The court
recognized the distinction between reim-
bursements to a family and reimbursements
to a parochial school but concluded that,
"there is no such distinction where the
parent is a mere conduit for a payment of
tuition."3 2
In adopting Section 11, the New York
Legislature relied on the theory that to
deny needy families the "right" to a reli-
gious education for their children would
be denying them free exercise of religion.
But public support of the "right" to free
exercise of religion was not the intention
of our Founding Fathers. In fact, "[i]f the
Founding Fathers had any intention about
religion it was surely to separate the con-
cern of the Government from the concern
of the individual religious community. 3 :
2 - F. Supp. at -.
30 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
31 Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
32 - F. Supp. at -.
33 Id. at -.
The PEARL court feared that there would
be no end to religious aid if a state subsidy
might be given for religious education.3 4
Although economic hardships and the bleak
future of Catholic schools were considered
by the court, it nevertheless stated that
"economic hardship alone is not enough to
overcome the strictures of the First Amend-
ment. 3 ' The PEARL opinion also noted
that "the payment of tuition for its pupils
makes the church school a State-supported
school," 3 6 an arrangement foreign to the
American way of life.
Section I1, a tax benefit program,
7
entitles parents of children attending
nonprofit, nonpublic schools to subtract
from their adjusted gross incomes certain
amounts designated by the Act, thus afford-
ing an income tax reduction.3 8 There are
restrictions, however. For example, the ex-
clusion may be multiplied by the number
of children attending nonpublic school but
34 "If State subsidy may be given for religious
education, why may it not be given to the poor
for the purchase of sacramental wine, or a
crucifix or a Torah, a printing press for Jehovah's
Witnesses, or for a trip to a Baptist convention
or to hear a favorite evangelist, or for a Muslim
to take his pilgrimage to Mecca." - F. Supp.
at -.
.5 Id. at -.
36 Id.
37 Such a program is analogous to a tax credit
program. However, there are certain distinguish-
ing features. A tax credit is subtracted from one's
actual income tax liability whereas the Section
III allowance is subtracted from one's adjusted
gross income. The higher your adjusted gross
income, the lower your tax exclusion. A tax
credit would be a fixed sum not exceeding 50 per
cent of a child's tuition.
38 - F. Supp. at - & n.6. The court cited the
following table contained in the Act:
such attendance must be on a full-time
basis and a maximum of three exclusions
is allowed. A parent must also have paid
at least fifty dollars in tuition for each
child. Parents with adjusted gross incomes
of from $5000 to $25,000 qualify for the
exclusion which may reach $1000 for each
child.3 9
In an unprecedented decision, the three-
judge panel, although split 2 to 1, upheld
the constitutionality of Section III. The
court equated the tax benefit program with
that of real property tax exemptions for
If New York
adjusted gross
income is:
Less than $9,000
9,000-10,999
11,000-12,999
13,000-14,999
15,000-16,999
17,000-18,999
19,000-20,999
21,000-22,999
23,000-24,999
25,000 and over
The amount
allowable for
each dependent is:
$1,000
850
700
550
400
250
150
125
100
-0-
The court's opinion also included an index of
"estimated net benefits:"
ESTIMATED
NET BENEFITS
Adjusted Gross
Income
Less than $9,000
9,000-10,999
11,000-12,999
13,000-14,999
15,000-16,999
17,000-18,999
19,000-20,999
21,000-22,999
23,000-24,999
25,000 and over
One
Child
$50.00
42.50
42.00
38.50
32.00
22.50
15.00
13.75
12.00
-0-
Two
Children
$100.00
85.00
84.00
77.00
64.00
45.00
30.00
27.50
24.00
-0-
Three
or more
$150.00
127.50
126.00
115.50
96.00
67.50
45.00
41.25
36.00
-0-
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churches 40 and income tax deductions for
religious contributions. 41 In differentiating
Section III from the other two sections of
the Act, the court found that a tax benefit
program would cover "all nonprofit private
schools in the State"42 and "does not in-
volve a subsidy or grant of money from the
State Treasury. '43 The court determined
that any benefit to parochial schools would
be remote, no danger of entanglement was
present and the purpose of the section
was purely secular.
It must be emphasized that this split de-
cision deals with a state statute and an
appeal to the Supreme Court is almost
inevitable. 44 Therefore, the argument for
both pro- and anti-tax benefit positions de-
serve close scrutiny. The PEARL majority
reasoned that if a tax exemption for church
property was permissible under the Walz
decision, then the New York plan of tax
benefits is likewise permissible because "the
grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship
since the government does not transfer part
40 Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664
(1970).
41 The constitutionality of income tax exemptions
for contributions to religious institutions has
never been tested in the Supreme Court.
42 - F. Supp. at -.
43 Id.
44 A decision of a three-judge federal panel is
directly appealable to the Supreme Court. On
October 3, 1972, the New York Times reported
the passing of a tax credit bill by the Ways and
Means Committee of the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives. When confronted with the question of
Supreme Court reaction, the Committee instructed
its staff to "draft a section of the bill providing
for a prompt Court test of its constitutionality."
It is almost certain that the Supreme Court will
rule on the constitutionality of a tax credit plan
by the summer of 1973. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3,
1972, at 26, col. 1.39 See note 38 supra.
SAVE OUR SCHOOLS
of its revenues to churches but simply
abstains from demanding that the church
support the state."'45 Section III grants the
exemption to individuals, not churches or
church schools, thereby creating an even
wider gap between the government and
religion than the Walz exemption.46 The
court, in further negation of the idea that
Section III constitutes a government spon-
sorship of religion, concluded that the sec-
tion did not limit the exemption to parents
who send their children to church schools.
Rather, the tax break is to be provided to
parents of those enrolled in any nonprofit,
nonpublic school.
The court also found that Section III
could be analogized to tax deductions for
religious contributions. In providing tax
benefits, the state loses revenue but the
lost revenues do not aid parochial schools
by being turned over to them as additional
tuition payments. The parent is simply be-
ing compensated for tuition already paid.
The court posed the following question:
"If a parishioner made a contribution to
his parish, and the parish school was en-
tirely tuition free, would he be denied his
income tax deduction because his child at-
tended the school?" 47 The majority would
45 397 U.S. at 675.
46 One wonders how much weight can be at-
tached to the court's complaint, with respect to
Section II, that "[t]he parent is simply a conduit."
- F. Supp. at -. In considering Section III, the
court seemed to think that the decisive difference
between tax subsidies and tax benefits was that
one involved a direct grant from the State
Treasury to religious institutions and the other
did not. It is interesting to note that the court
did not consider the "parent as conduit" argument
in relation to the tax benefit plan.
47 Id. at -.
answer this question in the negative and
thus concluded that the tax benefit plan, a
different application of the same principle,
is valid.
Second Circuit Judge Paul Hays pre-
sented a strong dissenting argument to the
PEARL majority's approval of Section III.
Judge Hays differentiated both tax exemp-
tions for Church property and tax deduc-
tions for religious contributions from the
tax benefits provided by the section. He
theorized that "the tax benefit statute was
quite frankly enacted as a substitute for
partial subsidies to parents who pay tuition
to religious schools. '48
Judge Hays asserted that there can be no
analogy between a tax exemption of church
property and a tax benefit program. It was
decided in Walz that the exemption at
issue would cover a broad class of property
owned by "non-profit, quasi-public corpo-
rations. '49 Over 93 per cent of New York
State's nonpublic schools, on the other
hand, are religious institutions. 50 In Judge
Hays' opinion, Wolman v. Essex5' is more
applicable than Walz to the PEARL situa-
tion. Wolman stated that "the limited na-
ture of the class affected by the legislation,
and the fact that one religious group so pre-
dominates within the class, makes suspect
the constitutional validity of the statute. '52
Turning to the majority's analogy to tax
deductions, Judge Hays found that tuition
payments made by parents are not contri-
48 Id. at - (dissenting opinion).
49 397 U.S. at 673.
50 - F. Supp. at - & n.1 (Hays, J., dissenting).
51 342 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Ohio), afl'd, - U.S.
- (1972).
52 Id. at 412.
butions and, therefore, tax benefits under
Section III are not given in lieu of a deduc-
tion for a contribution. Instead, the parent
of a child enrolled in a nonpublic school
pays tuition as consideration for the educa-
tion of his child. Judge Hays noted, "[a]
payment for services rendered is not a con-
tribution and such payments are not de-
ductible. '5
In an effort to prove that the tax benefit
program under Section III had the same
purpose and effect as the unconstitutional
tuition assistance plan of Section II, Judge
Hays quoted Mr. Justice Jackson, dissent-
ing in Everson v. Board of Education:5 4
The prohibition against establishment of
religion cannot be circumvented by a sub-
sidy, bonus, or reimbursement of expense
to individuals for receiving religious in-
struction and indoctrination.55
53 - F. Supp. at - (dissenting opinion). Judge
Hays quoted the court in DeJong v. Commis-
sioner, 36 T.C. 896, 899-900 (1961), afl'd, 309
F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962):
We are satisfied on the record before us that
at least a portion of the $1,075 paid by peti-
tioners to the society was in the nature of
tuition fees for the education which the society
was expected to furnish to petitioners' children
and was not in fact a true charitable contribu-
tion. Payments pledged and made by parents
in circumstances disclosed by the evidence were
not voluntary and gratuitous contributions mo-
tivated merely by the satisfaction which flows
from the performance of a generous act; they
were induced, at least in substantial part, by
the benefits which the parents sought and an-
ticipated from the enrollment of their children
as students in the society's school.
Although the PEARL majority and Judge Hays
apparently assumed the validity of deductions for
charitable contributions, that question has never
been reviewed by the Supreme Court.
54 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
55 Id. at 24.
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The benefits received under the tax exemp-
tion plan are quite similar to the benefits
received under the tuition assistance plan.
"In both instances the money involved rep-
resents a charge made upon the state for
the purpose of religious education. 5 An
opinion in another famous establishment of
religion case asserted that it is necessary to
our laws that "[w]hat may not be done
directly may not be done indirectly lest the
Establishment Clause become a mockery." 57
Lemon v. Sloan
After experiencing defeat of its Nonpub-
lic Elementary and Secondary Education
Act 5s in Lemon v. Kurtzman,5) Pennsyl-
vania promptly passed a new statute, 60 this
time omitting what the Supreme Court, in
considering the earlier scheme, had found
to be a fatal defect: provision of state finan-
cial aid directly to church-related schools.
The new plan provided that, if a nonpublic
school met the compulsory school atten-
dance requirements and certain federal
standards under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,61 then parents would be eligi-
ble for tuition reimbursement for school
years completed by their children attend-
56 - F. Supp. at - (dissenting opinion).
57 Abington School District v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 230 (Douglas, J., concurring).
58 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, §§ 5601-09 (Supp.
1971).
59 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For an excellent inter-
pretation and discussion of Lemon v. Kurtzman,
see Note, Public Assistance For Parochial Schools,
17 CATH. LAW. 189 (1971).
(;0 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, §§ 5701-09 (Supp.
1971).
61 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.et seq. Title Vt forbids dis-
crimination (on the basis of race, color or na-
tional origin) in programs which are receiving
financial assistance from the federal government.
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ing such schools. The act was carefully
drafted by the Pennsylvania Legislature so
as to include an express statement of secu-
lar purpose. In Lemon v. Sloan, 2 the court
concluded that such a purpose existed, i.e.,
stabilization of the cost of public education.
It was found that if rising costs and infla-
tion continued, parents of nonpublic school
children would transfer their children into
the public schools.63 Thus, "an enormous
added financial, education and administra-
tive burden would be placed upon the pub-
lic schools and upon the taxpayers of the
state."'64 Despite its finding of a secular
62 340 F. Supp. 1356 (E.D. Pa. 1972), appeal
docketed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3241 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1972)
(No. 72-620). This author feels that the Pennsyl-
vania aid program disguised under a "secular
purpose" was just another attempt to give direct
aid to parochial schools.
63 Many opponents of government aid to paro-
chial schools feel that the absorption of students
from parochial schools by the public schools will
not cause the grave problem that the alarmists
think it will. Examination of the enrollment fig-
ures, transfer data and income and birth rate
information has revealed that:
[T]he states facing the largest influx of parochial
pupils to public schools are the states with the
greatest ability to pay added public school
costs, if there are any. . . .Further, most, if
not all, of the transfers from parochial to
public schools between now and 1980 will
move into seats made empty by lower birth
rate. According to the Census Bureau, total
school enrollment will drop by 1.6 million
children between October 1971 and October
1975.
CHURCH & STATE, June, 1972, at 8. In an oppos-
ing opinion, the President's Panel on Nonpublic
Education warned that "closing down all the non-
public schools .. .would create a multitude of
severe problems, both financial and social." The
"public schools least able to accommodate pupils
would be the ones generally hardest hit by the
tide of transfers from nonpublic classrooms." U.S.
NEws & WORLD REPORT, May 1, 1972, at 36.
64 340 F. Supp. at 1359, citing Pennsylvania
purpose, the court declared the act uncon-
stitutional because of the lack of controls
on the expenditure of the funds.6 5
Clearly an unrestricted grant of funds by
the state directly to church-related schools
would constitute state support of religious
instruction and worship in violation of the
Establishment Clause. 66
The act was found to directly advance reli-
gion because it assisted parents in providing
their children with a religious education.
The result of the second Lemon challenge
illustrates that the courts will not permit a
result to be attained indirectly which could
not be attained directly.
Wolman v. Essex0 7
The parental reimbursement program
was tested a second time before a three-
judge federal district court in Ohio. 68 In
Parent Reimbursement Act for Nonpublic Educa-
tion, Appendix A, Act 92, § 2(4), Pa. Gen. Ass.,
Aug. 27, 1971.
65 It is necessary that any public assistance to
nonpublic schools must be restricted to "secular,
neutral or nonideological services, facilities, or
materials." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
616 (1971).
66 340 F. Supp. at 1363.
67 On October 10th, 1972, the Supreme Court
affirmed the decision in Wohnan v. Essex by an 8
to 1 vote. Without hearing arguments, the Court
ruled that the 1971 Ohio law was in violation
of the principle of separation of church and
state. The New York Times reported that:
The Court gave no reasons for its action in
the Ohio case. Justice Byron R. White, the
lone dissenter in 1971 when the Court ruled
out salary supplements to sectarian schools,
said the Court should have agreed to hear the
case.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1972, at 20, col. 1.
68 Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.
Ohio), afl'd, - U.S. - (1972).
deciding against that state's parental reim-
bursement program, 9 the court made a
statistical survey to discover exactly what
class of citizens would benefit most from
such a program. By determining the maxi-
mum benefit class, the court felt that it
could decide whether or not the effect of
the statute was to inhibit, advance, or re-
main neutral toward religion. 70 The results
showed that only 12 per cent of the entire
student population of Ohio attend non-
public schools and, of that percentage, 95
per cent attend Catholic schools..7 Thus,
the court decided that the
Ohio plan does not even purport to have
a general, broad ranging reach but is in-
stead restricted to a relatively small sample
of the entire class of Ohio students. As
with the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
statutes held unconstitutional in Lemon,
the class within the ambit of the statute
is overwhelmingly sectarian in character.
A substantial beneficiary of the statute
can only be organized religion. 72
Direct means of supporting nonpublic
schools having failed, the parental reim-
bursement plans of Pennsylvania and Ohio
were efforts to obtain financial aid for paro-
chial schools by indirect means. Since these
indirect, parental reimbursement plans have
also proved unsuccessful, the Church must
realistically deal with the fact that any
constitutional scheme of aid to parochial
schools must come as part of an aid pack-
age designed to benefit a class much
69 OHIo REV. CODE § 3317.062 (Supp. 1972).
7O See note 10 supra.
7' 342 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Ohio), afJ'd, - U.S.
- (1972).
72 Id. at 413.
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broader than Church schools. 73 Because
the government must act under the aegis
of a broad, impersonal type of public policy
when dispensing financial aid to private
religious institutions, it may be necessary
for the Church to reevaluate its view of
the problem and to seek aid from sources
beyond the reach of the court decisions.
7 4
Americans United for Separation of Church
and State v. Oakey
In Vermont, a state aid program pro-
vided a percentage grant of current ex-
penses to parochial schools but only if the
city or town school districts within which
the parochial schools were situated chose
to provide them with approved teachers
licensed with the school district. In Ameri-
cans United for Separation of Church &
State v. Oakey,7 5 the aid did not run di-
rectly to the parochial school as it did in
Lemon v. Kurtzman,76 but directly to the
73 See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971) (building construction grants to church-
related institutions of higher education); Walz v.
Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (govern-
ment property tax exemptions). See also Bd. of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (loaning of
secular textbooks to parochial school students);
Everson v. Bd of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (state-
financed busing). Everson and Allen upheld these
limited aid programs since they were analogous
to police and fire protection which are provided
for people and property regardless of any reli-
gious beliefs.
74 A few such programs are: performance con-
tracting, shared time and scholarship grants. See
notes 120-25 and accompanying text infra.
75 339 F. Supp. 545 (D. Vt. 1972).
76 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, aid ran di-
rectly to nonpublic elementary and secondary
schools in the form of state reimbursement for
costs of teachers' salaries, textbooks and instruc-
tional materials in specified secular subjects. The
Court considered church schools the principal
beneficiaries under the statute.
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public school district whose function was
to decide whether parochial schools in that
district should obtain aid. The innovation
Vermont legislators hoped would prove the
key to a finding of constitutionality was
the provision for granting the aid to the
public schools for their distribution to the
parochial schools. The Vermont act was
nevertheless declared unconstitutional be-
cause it fostered excessive entanglement of
government and religion.7 7 The statute
created a dual involvement situation. Ver-
mont, through its public school districts,
would have to police the hiring of teachers
and the buying of secular materials, thus
thrusting "the state not only directly into
the physical plants of the schools but also
into their operation and control." s78 The
Church, on the other hand, would inevita-
bly become involved with government au-
thorities on the questions of teacher-choice
and teacher-determination, both turned
over by the act to the public school dis-
tricts and their superintendents. The court
asserted that, "the potential ... for involve-
ment of the state, through the school dis-
tricts, in religious affairs is not dispelled by
its lack of articulation, ''7 9 in the statute.
PEARL v. Levitt
New York parochial schools experienced
a major court defeat when the Mandated
Service Act of 197080 was declared un-
77 339 F. Supp. 545. State control of teachers
in parochial schools would undoubtedly become
interwoven with religious control, and the "day-
to-day instructional administration would of
necessity be the result of close cooperation be-
tween the school's administration and the public
school district's administration." Id. at 552.
78 Id. at 551.
79 Id. at 551-52.
80 See note 4 supra.
constitutional by a three-judge panel of the
same federal court that was later to validate
parental tax benefits.8 ' This aid program
provided $28 million a year to compensate
nonpublic schools for secular services
"mandated" by state law. Such services in-
cluded "administration, grading and the
compiling and reporting of the results of
tests and examinations, maintenance of
pupil health records ...and the prepara-
tion and submission to the state of various
other reports as provided for or required
by law or regulation. 8s2 The major consti-
tutional defect of the act was its failure to
require that the recipient of the aid account
for the manner in which the money was
spent and return any amount in excess of
that actually used.8 3 Thus, any excess
amount could be utilized for the further-
ance of religious ideals. Such a result would
violate the requirement that the primary
effect of a statute must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion. In addition
to utilizing the principal effect theory, the
court struck down the Mandated Services
Act on the same entanglement ground that
defeated the Pennsylvania statute reviewed
81 PEARL v. Levitt, 342 F. Supp. 439 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), hearing granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S.
Nov. 7, 1972) (No. 72-269); PEARL v. Nyquist.
The latter case is discussed in notes 17-57 and
accompanying text supra.
82 N.Y. Sass. LAWS ch. 138 (1970).
83 The statute suffered from another constitu-
tional weakness. Because the program served such
a large number of religiously oriented groups, it
was evident to the court that an intensification of
political division between parochiaid supporters
and church-state separatists might well have re-
sulted. Such a "political division along religious
lines was one of the principal evils against which
the First Amendment was intended to protect."
342 F. Supp. at 445, citing Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. at 622.
in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 4 The only ap-
parent difference between the two laws was
that the Pennsylvania statute permitted
reimbursement for teaching and the New
York Mandated Services Act allowed re-
imbursement for testing. In addition, the
unconstitutional Pennsylvania statute re-
quired the nonpublic school to account for
expenditures while the New York act did
not require an accounting.85 The court con-
cluded, therefore, that the New York law
was unconstitutional under the Lemon v.
Kurtzman rule.86
[The] cumulative impact of the entire rela-
tionship arising under the statutes . . .
involves excessive entanglement between
government and religion.87
New Plans for Parochial Aid
It is apparent from the discussion of
these most recent cases that the courts are
taking a firm stand when presented with
questions of church-state separation. With
the exception of the tax benefit plan ap-
proved in PEARL v. Nyquist, the programs
presented to the courts were all found to
have one or more constitutional flaws. The
ends sought to be achieved by the various
statutes were thus ultimately found un-
attainable.
A majority of the new and innovative
programs for parochial aid have yet to be
tested. However, unlike most of the aid
programs just discussed, some of these new
plans try to cope with the problem from
within the nonpublic school systems. Al-
84 See note 10 supra.
85 Note 58 supra.
86 Note 10 supra.
87 342 F. Supp. at 443.
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though untested by the Supreme Court, it
is quite likely that the financial answer
parochial schools have been looking for is
contained in one or more of the following
proposals.
Tax Credits
Even though the courts have defeated
several aid plans, parochial aid advocates
in Washington have energetically set in
motion certain bills in a desperate attempt
to obtain financial relief for their schools.
Nearly a dozen bills dealing with tax credits
have been introduced in Congress this
year.8s
In theory, a tax credit plan would reim-
burse parents of nonpublic school children
for a portion of the cost of tuition.89 Under
two of the major tax credit bills, 90 "paro-
chial parents could subtract from their
federal income tax liability an amount for
each dependent in parochial or private
school not to exceed '(A) 50 per cent of
the tuition paid by the taxpayer during the
taxable year for the elementary or secon-
dary education of such dependent, or (B)
$400.' "91
The mechanics of the proposed tax credit
88 House Republican leader Gerald R. Ford and
Rep. John W. Byrnes introduced a tax credit bill
which would provide up to $2.24 billion annually
to parochial and private schools (H.R. Res.
13020). Other major bills introduced earlier were
H.R. Res. 12499 and H.R. Res. 12819. Recently,
Rep. Wilbur A. Mills, Chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee, and Rep. James A.
Burke, both Democrats, introduced H.R. Res.
13495, a tax credit bill quite similar to the bill
introduced by Republicans Ford and Byrnes.
89 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 1, 1972,
at 36.
90 H.R. Res. 13020; H.R. Res. 13495.
91 CMURCH & STATE, May 1972, at 6.
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bills are simple. For example, a parent
earning $20,000 would usually pay $3,000
in federal income taxes. If he has four
children in parochial school with an aver-
age of $500 tuition for each child, he
would be able to subtract $1000 from his
federal tax. The government would lose
$1000 in taxes, in effect paying a full one-
half of the parent's parochial school tuition
bill.92
Advocates of the tax credit plan claim
that it meets constitutional guidelines and,
additionally, that it "will promote public
good by sustaining current private invest-
ment in nonpublic education, will elicit
public support and will bolster the morale
of parents of nonpublic school children." 93
The opponents claim that not only will
taxes rise but also, most assuredly, tuition
at nonpublic schools will increase to gain
maximum advantage of the tax credits. The
poor, the childless and the elderly, who
would receive no credit, would then be at a
disadvantage if taxes were raised. The Pres-
idential Commission on School Finance,
realizing this weakness of the tax credit
proposal, recommended a four point fed-
eral assistance program. Such a program
would offer "supplemental income allow-
ance for nonpublic school tuition to welfare
recipients and the working poor," voucher
plans, child benefit programs and urban
education assistance programs.0 4
However, even with the implementation
92 Id.
93 Spiers, Tax Credits for Nonpublic School
Parents, AMERICA, May 20, 1972, at 537.
94 Id. It is the government's contention that with
the enactment of such a program, the poor would
not lose the opportunity to attend nonpublic
schools.
of this four point program, many opponents
feel that tax credits will increase "divisions
in our society . . . with the public schools
ultimately becoming nothing more than
'dumping grounds' for the poor and disad-
vantaged, religious and racial minorities,
and problem children not wanted by the
nonpublic schools." 95
Is the tax credit plan constitutionally
pure?96 Although the court in PEARL v.
Nyquist upheld the constitutionality of a
related plan, 97 that decision is certain to
be appealed to the Supreme Court. There
are certain aspects of tax credit plans that
are constitutionally questionable. For in-
stance, they would divert tax funds to
Church schools. They may foster excessive
entanglement of government and Church
affairs. 98 They would deprive the federal
government of tax funds desperately needed
by our public schools. They would, no
doubt, stimulate the growth of parochial
schools, but such growth would be at the
expense of the public schools. 99
95 Note 91 supra.
96 A tax credit is not a tax deduction. A deduc-
tion is an item subtracted from either gross in-
come or adjusted gross income. Business ex-
penses, contributions to churches and charities,
and some medical expenses are considered de-
ductible. A tax credit is subtracted from the total
tax due in order to fix one's actual income tax
liability.
97 - F. Supp. -.
98 Note, New Trends in Education and the
Future of Parochial Schools, 57 CORNELL L. REv.
256, 272 (1972) [hereinafter New Trends in
Education]. The court in PEARL v. Nyquist
stated: "As to administrative entanglement under
part three of the statute, we see none beyond
checking with the school simply to determine
whether the tuition claimed to have been paid
was actually paid." - F. Supp. at -.
99 At first the credit plan would favor existing
Supporters of the tax credit plan feel
that tax credits to parents avoid excessive
church-state entanglement because the par-
ent, not the school, is the recipient of the
aid. However, this argument has been
sharply criticized.100
As discussed earlier, the Ohio and Penn-
sylvania decisions 01 clearly indicate that
the courts will not buy a plan that simply
shifts aid from nonpublic schools to the par-
ents of children enrolled in those schools.
As stated in Wolman v. Essex:10 2
Since the parents in this scheme serve
as mere conduits of public funds, the State
retains a responsibility of insuring that the
public moneys thus provided and which
retain their public character throughout
the transaction, are used for constitu-
tionally permissible ends and continue to
be so used .... We conclude that it is of no
constitutional significance that state aid
goes indirectly to denominational schools
parochial school systems. But then it would
stimulate the growth and proliferation of
parochial and private school systems, progres-
sively depriving the public schools of funds,
students and public support. This would frag-
ment and deconsolidate all education, making
it more expensive and ultimately causing taxes
to rise higher than they would if all children
attended public schools.
CHURCH & STATE, May 1972, at 6.
100 Judge Hays, dissenting in part in PEARL v.
Nyquist, stated, "There is no essential difference
between a parent's receiving a $50 reimbursement
for tuition paid to a parochial school and his
receiving a $50 benefit because he sends his child
to parochial school." - F. Supp. at - (dis-
senting opinion).
101 Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.
Ohio), afl'd, - U.S. - (1972); Lemon v. Sloan,
340 F. Supp. 1356 (E.D. Pa. 1972), appeal
docketed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3241 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1972)
(No. 71-620).
102 342 F. Supp. 399 (S. D. Ohio 1972).
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... through the medium of parental grants.
Since the potential ultimate effect of the
scheme is to aid religious enterprises, the
Establishment Clause forbids its implemen-
tation regardless of the form adopted in
the statute for achieving that purpose. 10 3
The tax credit plan is sometimes com-
pared with real property tax exemptions for
Church property which were held constitu-
tional in 1970.104 However, the government
involvement in Walz was far less than can
be expected when implementing a tax credit
plan.10 5
It is apparent that there are drawbacks
to a tax credit plan. Such a plan, if imple-
mented, might seriously endanger church-
state separation and the future of our pub-
lic school systems.
103 Id. at 416-17.
104 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
However, a tax credit plan benefits only those
taxpayers with nonpublic school expenditures.
Tax exemptions, on the other hand, may benefit
a wide range of charitable institutions, thus
avoiding the question of whether the primary
effect of such a plan is to inhibit or advance
religion. The tax exemption analogy was used by
the majority in PEARL v. Nyquist to uphold the
constitutionality of tax benefits. - F. Supp. -.
105 New Trends in Education at 272 (1972).
The government's involvement in Walz was
limited to ascertaining that church, educational or
charitable property was the beneficiary of the tax
exemption. However, a tax credit plan would in-
volve a greater administrative burden and thus
may present a problem of excessive entangle-
ment of government and religion. For an ex-
cellent discussion of the Walz decision, see
Kauper, The Walz Decision: More on the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 69 MICH. L.
REV. 179 (1970). The majority in PEARL v.
Nyquist did not find the question of entangle-
ment a bar to determining that a tax benefit
program was constitutional. See notes 42-43 and
accompanying text supra.
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Voucher Plans
Another approach, promoted by the
Nixon Administration through the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OFO), is the tui-
tion voucher plan.100 Under such a plan,
all schools would receive funds from gov-
ernment tax sources through the device of
vouchers issued to parents but cashable
only by schools.1 0 7 Schools must satisfy
certain criteria in order to become eligible
to receive vouchers. Educational standards
must be upheld, records must be kept,
equal opportunity to any student without
regard to race must be practiced.108
Our courts have adopted a constitu-
tional standard of government neutrality on
religious matters.10 9 Because of this stand,
106 See CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PUBLIC
POLICY, EDUCATION VOUCHERS: A PRELIMINARY
REPORT ON FINANCING EDUCATION BY PAYMENTS
TO PARENTS (1970), reviewed, Ross & Zeck-
hauser, Book Review, 80 YALE L.J. 451 (1970).
See also Areen, Educational Vouchers, 6 HARv.
CIv. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 466 (1971) [here-
inafter Educational Vouchers]; C. Jencks, Educa-
tional Vouchers, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 4,
1970, at 19. There have been a few recent devel-
opments in voucher plan utilization: (1) OEO
provided a $40,000 grant to a school district in
New Rochelle, N.Y., for a study on implementa-
tion of a voucher plan; (2) a Seattle, Wash.,
school board rejected a voucher program after
$123,000 was spent on research; and (3) a San
Jose, Calif., school district is presently con-
ducting a two-year voucher experiment for public
schools with $2 million in federal aid. The San
Jose plan originally called for the inclusion of a
parochial school and a private school but the
California legislature refused to enact any state
tax aid legislation for parochial schools. Vouchers
Suffer a Setback, CHURCH & STATE, June, 1972, at
10; O.E.O. Voucher Push Continues, CHURCH &
STATE, May, 1972, at 17.
107 New Trends in Education at 264.
108 Id. at 264.
109 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). The
voucher systems would have to avoid any
unconstitutional connection between gov-
ernment and religious institutions. Advo-
cates claim that the voucher plan can be
analogized to welfare programs or social
security schemes. 110 It is not unlikely that
some welfare parents use their allotments
to send their children to parochial schools
nor is it unlikely that some of the elderly
pledge their meager social security funds
to the Church. However, both uses of gov-
ernment funds for religious purposes are
constitutional because the aid is received
for a purpose other than the advancement
of religion and the gap between church
and state is ample. Some feel that as long
as parents have freedom to choose either a
religious or non-religious school, the Reli-
gion Clauses would not be violated. 11'
However, the "primary effect" portion of
the three-pronged Lemon v. Kurtzman test
might prove a barrier to such a system of
vouchers if the system, and arguments for
Court held that the New York "released time"
program did not violate the first amendment.
In emphasizing the government's neutral posi-
tion, the Court explained that the "Government
may not finance religious groups nor undertake
religious instruction nor blend secular and sec-
tarian education nor use secular institutions to
force one or some religion on any person. But
we find no constitutional requirement which
makes it necessary for government to be hostile
to religion and to throw its weight against efforts
to widen the effective scope of religious in-
fluence. The government must be neutral when
it comes to competition between sects." (em-
phasis added). Id. at 314. See W. GRIFFITHS,
RELIGION, THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS (1966).
110 Cf. Bertch v. Social Welfare Dep't, 45 Cal.
App. 2d 524, 289 P.2d 485 (1955), which upheld
the validity of old age payments to an individual
who donated his payment to a religious group.
I"l See Educational Vouchers at 495.
its first amendment validity, were based
solely on parental freedom of choice."
2
It is obvious that both parents and paro-
chial schools would profit from a tuition
voucher plan. Parents would benefit from
reduced tuition payments; parochial schools
would benefit from increased enrollments
and greater revenues; and both benefits
would be the result of government pro-
vided funds. The constitutionality of a
voucher plan will depend on its primary
effect and the courts are certain to inquire
whether the primary effect is increased en-
rollment for religious schools or the op-
portunity for parents, through lower tui-
tions, to send their children to parochial
schools. In other words, does a voucher
plan primarily aid the individual or the
parochial school? The nondiscriminatory
nature of vouchers, that is, their availability
to parents of both public and parochial
school students, may be the key to placing
them within the guidelines of government
neutrality set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.
However, the plans have yet to be tested
by the Supreme Court.
If the "freedom of choice" theory does
not survive the scrutiny of the courts, ad-
vocates claim that the "no proscribed bene-
fit" theory will," 3 i.e., a voucher plan that
would compensate religious schools only
for the cost of teaching secular subjects.
Because of its secular purpose, such a plan
would meet the test formulated in Board
of Education v. Allen." 4 However, if the
112 See note 101 supra. To survive a constitu-
tional test, a voucher plan, in addition to having
a neutral purpose, must have a primary effect
which neither inhibits nor advances religion.
113 Educational Vouchers at 496.
114 392 U.S. 236 (1968). The Court in Allen
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aid were restricted to purely secular activi-
ties, the state would be forced to a) make
an initial determination as to the secular
or religious nature of every parochial school
program, b) ascertain the portion of tui-
tion payments allocable to the cost of
secular programs and c) continually police
each approved activity to make certain
that it remained secular. Such involvement
would no doubt be considered an excessive
entanglement of church and state."-
Voucher systems would afford all fami-
lies the same opportunity to send their
children to religious institutions. However,
taxpayers would eventually pay for this op-
portunity. Proponents of voucher aid meet
this objection by stating:
As long as the state spends no more to
educate a child at the parochial school
than it would to educate the child in a
public school, and as long as it receives
secular services of equal value in either
case, the taxpayer is not subsidizing the
religious aspect of parochial education.1 6
This view rests on the theory of absorp-
tion which assumes that, absent some form
of aid, the public schools will be flooded
with students transferring from closed pa-
rochial schools, thus increasing the school
tax bite. Given these assumptions, it is
conceivable that the taxpayer would suffer
interpreted the first amendment as requiring any
aid program to have "'a secular legislative pur-
pose and a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion.'" Id. at 243, quoting
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at
222 (1963).
115 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
The Walz court stressed the need to avoid ex-
cessive entanglement of church and state.
116 Educational Vouchers at 500.
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less under a tuition voucher system. How-
ever, if the parochial schools can, in fact,
solve their financial crisis from within and
if the declining birthrate continues, 1 7 the
taxpayer would not only be at a financial
disadvantage but would be supporting a
system that is constitutionally questionable.
In order for a voucher system to succeed
under the Lemon v. Kurtzman rule, aid
would have to be channelled into secular
activities in a manner that would not entail
excessive governmental involvement. By
allowing an individual freedom to choose
whether or not he will use his voucher for
religious education, it is conceivable that the
''excessive entanglement" obstacle would
be overcome.1 1 8 However, the question of
"primary effect" would still have to be con-
sidered. The utilization of a "secular value
theory," aid being directed only toward
secular subjects, would be a necessary step
in avoiding an effect that primarily aids
religion. Standardized tests might be ap-
plied to determine the value of the secular
education offered by parochial schools.'1 9
If such value is found to be equal to that
of public school curricula, then voucher
payments to parochial schools would have
a secular effect. To meet the constitutional
test, a voucher program must incorporate
all these approaches in the hope that the
117 See note 63 supra.
118 Such a program would advance both paro-
chial and public education throughout the coun-
try. Government entanglement is reduced because
it is the parent who would receive the voucher
and it is the parent who would decide where the
tuition award would go.
119 Areen, Public Aid to Non-Public Schools: A
Breach in the Sacred Wall?, 22 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 230, 252-53 (1971).
extensive proof required by the Lemon v.
Kurtzman rule will be satisfied.
Performance Contracting
A third solution to the parochial school
problem might conceivably be "perfor-
mance contracting."' 120 Under this ap-
proach, as presently implemented, local
public schools contract out a portion of
their teaching burden to private com-
panies. 121 Usually the courses contracted
away, often under a federal grant, are
mathematics and reading.1 22
If nonpublic schools were to contract
with the same private concerns utilized by
public authorities and transfer to those
companies responsibility for teaching the
same types of basic, secular subjects, it is
difficult to imagine a solid constitutional
objection to a state's picking up the tab for
the resultant contractual obligations. No
excessive entanglement would be involved;
direct aid would not be an issue; and a
secular purpose and effect are clear.
The major purpose of such plans is to
increase the quality of student output
through the introduction of a "profit stim-
120 Schwartz, Performance Contracting: Indus-
try's Reaction, NATION'S SCHOOLS, Sept. 1970, at
53.
121 N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1971, at 68, col. 5.
122 Id. Firms which have contracts include:
Singer/Graftlex, Inc.; Quality Educational Devel-
opment; Westinghouse Learning Corporation Plan
Education Centers; Learning Foundations Inter-
national, Inc. and Alpha Learning Systems. Al-
though certain firms have begun work on "per-
formance contracts" this approach to education
is new and undeveloped. Reaction from industry
has been mixed. Schwartz, Performance Con-
tracting: Industry's Reaction, NATION'S SCHOOLS,
Sept. 1970, at 53.
ulus" into the schoolroom. 123 This tech-
nique would undoubtedly transform paro-
chial schools from pastoral to educational
institutions. 124 Because private enterprise
would be handling most of the education,
parochial schools would be able to com-
pete with the newer, highly advanced pub-
lic schools. 125
123 New Trends in Education at 270. The in-
troduction of the profit motive should inject a
competitive aspect into our educational structure.
It is the result of this competition (usually for
student's tuition) that advocates hope will in-
crease student productivity.
124 Luettgen, Church Schools-in the American
Secular State, AMERICA, May 27, 1972, at 567.
By changing the structure of parochial schools,
"the secular state would then have less reason to
fear the spectre of a creeping church-state." Id.
at 569.
125 A radical possibility for educational change,
one that combines aspects of performance con-
tracting and vouchers, would see the abolition of
public schools and parochial schools as we know
them today. The country's educational system
would consist entirely of secular, profit-making
schools with the Church school existing as a
religious supplement to a child's formal educa-
tion. (By religious supplement is meant that the
parochial school would exist just to serve the
religious needs of the community. In this way,
both secular and religious education could
prosper.)
Government-issued vouchers would provide
the financial backbone for the system of private,
secular schools. By releasing Church schools from
the burden of teaching secular courses and by in-
jecting the profit motive into the school system,
constitutional barriers that are evident in the
other plans would be avoided. Such an approach
is an offshoot and extension of the "released
time" program tested in Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306 (1952). Under that plan, students
were allowed to leave public schools and attend
parochial schools for religious instruction. Id.
See Byrne, A Report on Shared Time in TRENDs
AND IsSUES IN CATHOLIC EDUCATION (R. Hurley
& R. Shaw eds. 1969); Note, Shared Time: In-
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The Youngstown Plan, A Program for
Self-Help
One of the newest approaches is a self-
help program called the Youngstown
Plan.126 It adopts a four-step evaluation
technique to involve pastor, teachers and
parishioners in a decision making process.
Its goal is to stop needless closings of
Catholic schools.
The "Process for School Closings, Con-
solidations and Probations"' 27 as this com-
munity action plan is formally known,
includes the following steps. First, the Di-
ocesan Board of Education considers any
problem relating to a parochial school.
Second, the board establishes a committee
consisting of the pastor, two board mem-
bers, one staff member and three to five
parents or parishioners to study the case.
Third, the committee draws up a provi-
sional solution which is then introduced to
interested members of the community.
direct Aid to Parochial Schools, 65 MICH. L. REv.
1224 (1967). Neither public monies nor public
schools were utilized, the only entanglement
being the arrangement of public school schedules
to allow the religious needs of Catholic school
children to be satisfied.
Limiting the Church school to purely religious
education would permit the development of a
program of self-help to solve the financial and
social problems of the parochial schools. See note
16 supra. However, the limited function such an
approach visualizes for nonpublic schools would
undoubtedly be opposed by many Church au-
thorities who would feel that it is contrary to the
philosophy that has supported the existence of
the Catholic schools, i.e., the idea that children
should be educated in a religious atmosphere.
126 Spiers, The Youngstown Plan, AMERICA,
June 24, 1972, at 650.
127 Id. at 651.
SAVE OUR SCHOOLS
Finally, the diocesan board either accepts
or rejects the solution or offers an alter-
nate proposal. This plan utilizes the entire
community and avoids "the danger" of
ignoring problems and "the danger" of
panic. 12s Incorporated in the plan are
methods of consolidation and continuation
to be utilized, if and when needed, by the
parochial school. There are four possible
decisions the diocesan board can adopt:
(A) Closing: If it is established that a
school cannot reopen because of decreased
enrollment and skyrocketing costs, the
board will permit it to close down. Parents
would be advised to enroll their children
in other district parochial schools; (B)
Consolidation: The board might recom-
mend the reduction of four schools to a
two-school operation; (C) Probationary
Continuance: A school might be permitted
to continue but its status would be re-
viewed regularly. Increased enrollment
might result in such a school achieving a
permanent continuance status. (D) Con-
tinuation: These schools would remain in
operation while the board concentrates on
increasing their enrollment and obtaining
more funds.
This plan, although presently an unusual
one, could provide a valuable working
model for curbing the ever-increasing clos-
ings of Catholic schools throughout the
country. Instead of Church schools falling
victim to hasty, unplanned closings, Cath-
olic communities could work together in a
carefully planned operation to determine
the fate of their schools.
128 Id. These "dangers" would result in un-
planned, chaotic closings of Catholic schools.
Conclusion
By approaching the problem from within,
utilizing self-help programs, private inves-
tors, consolidations and similar measures,
parochial schools would avoid a constitu-
tional confrontation with the courts. Al-
though voucher plans and tax credits would
add greatly to the financial stability of paro-
chial schools, they are constitutionally
questionable and may prove to have harm-
ful effects that would exceed any good they
might do.
Parents have the right to send their chil-
dren to parochial schools. 129 However, if
they make such a choice, they should be
able to support it themselves rather than
seek aid in a manner that will undermine
the school system they choose not to accept.
There will be more court cases, more
proposed answers and more defeats as
parochial education attempts to chart a
course between a court-created "Scylla and
Charybdis." On the one hand, a state can-
not allocate funds which may be used for
the sectarian instruction of the children in
nonpublic schools. On the other hand, if
a state imposes supervisory controls to in-
sure that public monies will not be spent
to advance religion, the church-state rela-
tionship becomes one of excessive entangle-
ment. 13° As a review of this year's major
129 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925). The state cannot standardize children by
"forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers only. The child is not the mere creature
of the State; those who nurture him and direct
his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations." Id. at 535.
130 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-
13 (1971).
cases has disclosed, a majority of the aid
programs have run afoul of one or both of
these twin constitutional obstacles. Only a
New York tax benefit plan was able to sur-
vive. Yet, the fate of such a plan is still
in doubt as it has yet to be reviewed by the
Supreme Court.
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Perhaps the Church community could
benefit from Odysseus' experience by ap-
plying his resourcefulness and spirit to the
task of reevaluating its educational poli-
cies in light of its limited resources rather
than cursing the fates of unfriendly court
decisions.
